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1. Introduction
Continuity of tectonic movements, evolutionary
history, and geomorphic setup of the terrain, together with 
peculiar meteorological conditions make the Himalayan 
region vulnerable to a number of hazards. 
Located in the central sector of the Himalaya to the 
west of Nepal (Figure 1), Uttarakhand province in India 
is routinely devastated by flash flood, flood, landslide, 
and cloudburst incidences (Table 1), particularly during 
the monsoon period (mid-June to mid-September) when 
the region experiences heavy precipitation due to SW 
monsoon.
These losses are often associated with localised heavy 
rainfall events, referred as cloudburst, that have registered 
a marked increase in the Himalayan region during the 
previous decade, and are often attributed to climate 
change [1-3]. Ensuing sudden increase in the discharge 
of streams sometimes results in flash flood conditions, 
and during the monsoon period of 2010, 2012, and 2013 
Uttarakhand witnessed major devastation due to these [4]. 
Cloudburst is however not the only cause of flash floods, 
and the region has witnessed incidences wherein streams 
have been blocked by landslides, and subsequent release 
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204 persons were killed while two hydropower projects located in close 
proximity at Rishiganga (13.2 MW), and Tapoban (520 MW) were 
damaged in Dhauliganga flood of February 7, 2021 in the Indian Himalaya. 
This incidence occurred during the winter season when the discharge 
of the glacier fed rivers is minimal, and no rain was experienced in the 
region around the time of the flood. Despite discharge of the main river, 
Rishiganga, not involved in the flood due to damming upstream of its 
confluence with Raunthi Gadhera, based on field evidences massive 
volume of around 6 million cu m water involved in this flood is attributed 
to sequential intermittent damming at three different places; (i) Raunthi 
Gadhera was dammed first in its upper reaches, (ii) Rishiganga river was 
then dammed to the north of Murunna, and (iii) finally Dhauliganga river 
was dammed around Rini village to the upstream of its confluence with 
Rishiganga river. Lacking warning system only enhanced the flood-induced 
devastation. Legally binding disaster risk assessment regime, together with 
robust warning generation, and dissemination infrastructure are therefore 
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Figure 1. Map of Uttarakhand with Dhauliganga valley highlighted (above), and map of Dhauliganga valley (below).
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of impounded water has caused devastating flash floods 
(Table 2) [5]. These incidences are generally referred to as 
landslide lake outburst floods (LLOF).
Alaknanda river valley of Garhwal Himalaya has been 
particularly vulnerable to LLOFs, and 33% of the reported 
incidences are associated with Dhauliganga valley (Table 2). 
2. Dhauliganga Flood of 2021
The discharge of Rishiganga, and Dhauliganga 
rivers in Chamoli district of Uttarakhand increased 
suddenly in the forenoon of February 7, 2021 and the 
floodwaters washed off a hydropower project of 13.2 
MW capacity on Rishiganga river upstream of Rini while 
to the downstream, dam axis and other structures of an 
under construction hydropower project of 520 MW on 
Dhauliganga river at Tapoban were severely damaged 
(Figure 2). Persons working in these projects were washed 
off or buried in the debris. At the time of the incidence 
30-35 persons were working in a tunnel at Tapoban that 
was chocked with debris, and these persons could not be 
rescued.
Even though agriculture is practiced over alluvial, and 
colluvial terraces on middle, and lower slopes of the valley, 
habitations in the region are traditionally located at higher 
elevations and these did not witness direct flood impact. 
Connectivity of surrounding 13 villages was however 
disrupted as six bridges were damaged by the floodwaters. 
Low lying agricultural fields were also damaged while 360 
farm animals were lost in this incidence. 09 persons of the 
surrounding villages (05 of Rini, 02 of Tapoban, and 02 
of Ringi) together with 02 personnel of state Police were 
amongst 204 persons that went missing. 
There being no discharge measurement station in 
the catchment of Dhauliganga river, exact estimates of 
the flood volume are not available. A gauging station 
of Central Water Commission (CWC), 18 km 
downstream of Tapoban on the Alaknanda river at 
Marwari however recorded discharge of 1670 cumecs 
at 1100 hrs on February 7, 2021 as against normal 
discharge of around 41 cumecs. Around 6 million cu m 
water estimatedly passed through this gauging station in 
one hour. There being no rainfall, or accompanying flood 
incidence in the region entire excess discharge of the 
Alaknanda river at Marwari on February 7, 2021 is 
attributed to the flood incidence in Dhauliganga river valley. 
Thick pile of fluvio-glacial sediments brought down 
by the floodwaters, were deposited all along the valley. 
According to the cross section measurements of the 
Alaknanda river by CWC at Marwari on February 10, 
2021 the river bed was risen by 3.09 m. Thickness of the 
deposited sediments was observed to be more than 12 m 
at the dam site at Tapoban. 
Table 1. Disaster induced losses in the Uttarakhand province in the period 2010-21.
Year




houses damaged / destroyed
Loss of Agriculture 
land 
(in ha)Dead Missing Injured Partially Severely Fully
2010 220 - 139 1,798 10,672 - 1,215 240.9
2011 83 - 71 876 5,814 - 514 806.4
2012 176 - 96 997 743 - 285 40.3
2013 225 4,021 238 11,268 11,938 3,001 2,295 1309.0
2014 66 - 66 371 1,260 278 342 1285.5
2015 55 - 3,717 1,313 125 81 15.5
2016 119 05 1,391 2,684 839 252 112.3
2017 84 27 1,020 1,067 434 101 21.0
2018 100 09 764 2,042 433 122 295.4
2019 102 02 1,323 571 64 300 238.8
2020 82 03 718 448 442 135 1087.1
2021 308 61 1,048 715 395 18.7
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Data source: State Emergency Operations Centre (SEOC), Uttarakhand.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jees.v3i2.3069
64
Journal of Environmental & Earth Sciences | Volume 03 | Issue 02 | October 2021
Distributed under creative commons license 4.0
Table 2. Landslide lake outburst flood incidences in Alaknanda river valley of Garhwal Himalaya.
Sl. No.
Date / year of 
blockade
Place of damming Date of breach Remarks
1. 1868
Alaknanda river blocked by landslide 
upstream of Chamoli [6]
1868





Birahiganga near its confluence with 
Alaknanda [7]
1893
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
Water impounded to 10-13 m 
above normal. 
2 bridges damaged.
3. September 6, 1893
Birahiganga river blocked by landslide 
forming
Gohna Tal [8]
August 25, 1894 
(Partial breach)
Landslide dam was 350 m high.
Life loss averted by regular 
monitoring, warning





Massive loss of infrastructure, 
particularly at Srinagar
5. 1930
Alaknanda river blocked near  
Badrinath [9]
1930
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
Water impounded to 9 m above 
the normal water level
Some houses damaged
6. 1957
Dhauligana river blocked near Bhapkund 
by an avalanche along Dronagiri river [9]
1957
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
The lake was later filled with 
debris
7. February 4, 1968
Rishiganga river blocked by landslide 
near Rini [10,11] 
July 20, 1970
Water impounded to 40 m above 
the normal water level
Extensive damage in downstream 
areas
8. September, 1969
Alaknanda river blocked partially 
upstream of Kaliasaur [11]
1969 
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
9. July 20, 1970
Dhauliganga river blocked near Tapoban 
by the debris brought down by Dhak 
Nala [11]
July 20, 1970
Water impounded to 15-20 m 
above normal water level
10. July 20, 1970
Alaknanda river blocked near Helang by 
the debris brought down by Karmanasa 
Nadi [11]
July 20, 1970
11. July 20, 1970
Alaknanda river blocked by landslide 
near Hanuman Chatti at Badrinath [10,11]
July 20, 1970
Water impounded to 30-60 m 
above the normal water level
Breach caused considerable loss 
of life 
12. July 20, 1970
Patalganga river blocked by landslide 
[7,12] July 20, 1970
Water impounded to 60 m above 
the normal water level
Major flooding in Alaknanda river
Belakuchi village washed off
13. April, 1979
Alaknanda river blocked by avalanche 
near Bamni village in the proximity of 
Badrinath [13]
1979
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
The blockade was in the 
proximity of Badrinath and 
triggered by avalanche action
14. 2002
Gandhwi river blocked by landslide near 
Saigari village [14]
2002
(Duration of impoundment not 
clear)
Dhauliganga river was flooded by 
the breach, and
Saigari village devastated 
15. February 7, 2021
Course of Raunthi Gadhera, Rishiganga 
and Dhauliganga blocked 
February 7, 2021
(Impoundment was for short 
duration)
204 persons dead
Major devastation to two 
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Figure 2. Devastation at the dam site of Dhauliganga 
hydropower project.
3. Initial Suggestions on the Cause of Flash Flood
According to an online report based on satellite
imageries of Planet Lab, rock mass together with some 
ice got detached along a crack on the flank of Nanda 
Ghunti at an elevation of 5,600 m asl, and fell to 3,800 
m asl initiating a rock and ice avalanche that travelled 
down the glacier generating vast quantity of dust, which 
was observed to be smeared to the west of the valley 
[15]. Energy generated by the impact of the free fall of 
huge rock mass and ice over almost 1,800 m was held 
responsible for quickly melting the snow and ice available 
in the area, and initiating a debris flow that rushed 
downslope to cause the devastation [15]. 
Based on the analysis of LISS-IV satellite data 
Uttarakhand Space Application Centre (USAC), Dehradun 
informed the provincial government on February 9, 2021 
that a lake has come into existence along the course of the 
Rishiganaga river at a distance of around 06 km upstream 
of Rini due to the mass movement along Raunthi Gadhera. 
This report expressed possibility of breach of this lake 
that could jeopardize safety and security of the persons 
engaged in rescue work at Tapoban. Efforts were therefore 
made to assess the threat posed by the lake that breached 
naturally on February 12, 2021.
On February 10, 2021 Indian Institute of Remote 
Sensing (IIRS), Dehradun reported sudden disappearance 
of snow over almost 14 sq km area (Figures 3 and 4), 
and added that the avalanche triggering the event also 
involved melting of fresh snow over this area. Apart 
from the energy generated by the impact of the rock fall 
[15], presence of water was attributed to abnormal rise in 
temperature that was ascertained from the WRF model. 
Volume of water generated in this process was estimated 
as 2-3 million cu m.
Figure 3. Planet Lab satellite data of the area of February 
7, 2021.
Source: Courtesy Dr. Prakash Chauhan, Director, IIRS.
Based on the analysis of Sentinel-2 satellite imageries 
of February 5 and 8, 2021 IIRS, Dehradun later assessed 
the volume of rock mass dislodged along a pre-existing 
crack on the flank of the western peak adjacent to Trishul 
glacier as 39.67 million cu m. This rock mass reportedly 
impacted the valley floor 1,456 m below, near the snout of 
Trishul glacier generating 1.51 X 1012 J energy that was 
assessed to have melted 4.5 million ton ice in 1.5 hours to 
initiate the flood event.
Figure 4. Planet Lab satellite data of the area of February 
6, 2021.
Source: Courtesy Dr. Prakash Chauhan, Director, IIRS.
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Wadia Institute of Himalayan Geology (WIHG), 
Dehradun on February 10, 2021 expressed possibility 
of temporary blockade of the Raunthi Gadhera due to 
avalanche debris at an elevation of 3600 m asl for a few 
hours in the morning hours of February 7, 2021. Breach of 
this impoundment was put forth as being the cause of the 
flash flood.
Figure 5. View of the lake formed in Rishiganga river on 
February 11, 2021.
Source: Courtesy Dr. M.P.S. Bisht, Director, USAC.
International  Centre for  Integrated Mountain 
Development  (ICIMOD),  Kathmandu [16] as  a lso 
unpublished report of the Glacier and Permafrost Hazards 
in Mountains (GAPHAZ), based on the analysis of 
satellite imageries brought forth evidence of an ice or 
rock/ice avalanche in the same area between September 19 
and 26, 2016. Besides frictional melting and liquification 
of ice, these reports suggested possibility of reactivation 
of buried ice together with water trapped under and within 
the 2016 avalanche debris.
4. Methodology
The flood in the Dhauliganga river valley took place
during the winter season when the discharge of glacier fed 
Himalayan streams and rivers is minimum. At the same 
time this incidence was not accompanied by major rainfall 
event. In such a situation pinpointing the source of the 
floodwaters was a major challenge and different reasons 
were thus put forward for explaining the flood incidence. 
None of these reports convincingly explain the source 
of huge quantity of water required to initiate the flash 
flood. Moreover, Rishiganga river, with a catchment area 
of 664 sq km, being the main tributary of Dhauliganga 
river, was blocked by the debris brought down by the rock 
fall-avalanche along the Raunthi Gadhera (Figure 5). This 
implies that the flood resulting in additional discharge 
of 1,629 cumecs in the Alaknanda river was caused 
by the Raunthi Gadhera alone. It is not convincing if a 
small rivulet with catchment area of only 83 sq km could 
generate enough water to cause this massive flood. 
As observed in different satellite imageries rock mass 
which is estimated as being 39.67 million cu m by IIRS, 
Dehradun got detached from a higher elevation with some 
ice mass. No report convincingly puts forth the proportion 
of ice in this rock mass. Moreover, for initiating a flash 
flood, melting has to be instantaneous. It is not convincing 
that frictional forces, and energy generated in the impact 
could instantaneously melt huge volume of ice to initiate 
this flood.
All available reports on this event are 
primarily based on satellite data and have no field 
evidences to supplement their assertions. Detailed 
fieldwork was therefore undertaken in the affected area 
to understand the mechanism of this flood event and 
convincingly reconstruct the sequence of events resulting 
in this massive flood incidence so as to suggest a strategy 
for minimising possibility of similar incidences in future. 
Moreover, to validate the assertion of abnormal 
temperature increase rainfall and temperature data of 
various observation stations of India Meteorological 
Department (IMD) and Uttarakhand State Disaster 
Management Authority (USDMA) was assessed and 
analysed. 
5. Field Observations
Dhauliganga river originates in the proximity of Niti 
pass, and flows SW till Rini where it has confluence with 
Rishiganga river which originates from the glaciers of 
Nanda Devi massif with Nanda Devi (7,817 m) being the 
highest peak, and flows NW. Originating from around 
Nanda Ghungti (6,309 m) and flowing N, Raunthi Gadhera 
is a major tributary of Rishiganga river. From Rini to 
Chamtoli (1.0 km downstream of Tapoban) Dhauliganga 
river maintains a tectonically controlled E-W course, 
and thereafter flows SE to meet the Alaknanda river at 
Vishnuprayag (Figure 1).
Dhaul iganga val ley has  rugged mountainous 
topography with high relative relief, and the altitudes vary 
between 1,450 and 7,817 m asl. Geo-tectonically aligned 
narrow valleys and gorges are prominent geomorphic 
features of this area. In the upper stretches of the valley 
up to Bhapkund, where a hot spring is located, distinct 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jees.v3i2.3069
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glacial landforms with characteristic ‘U’ shaped valleys, 
outwash deposits, hanging valleys, moraines and cirques 
are observed. To the downstream, between Jelam and 
Juma the landforms are observed to be modified by fluvial 
action with distinct “V” shaped incised valleys and deep 
gorges. Thick pile of overburden, steep slopes and high 
precipitation make this stretch prone to mass wastage. 
Thereafter, Dhauliganga river is observed to flow through 
a wide valley till Rini, and the valley becomes 
relatively narrow to the downstream till Tapoban where 
another hot spring is located. Narrow valley is observed 
thereafter till Vishnuprayag.
Evidences of previous damming are observed on the 
left bank of Dhauliganga river on road section close to hot 
spring at Tapoban. These lacustrine deposits consist of an 
inter-bedded sequence of sand, silt, and pebbles (Figure 6).
Figure 6. Evidence of ponding on the left bank of 
Dhauliganga river in the proximity of hot water spring 
near Tapoban.
Distinct marks of inundation and fresh erosion are 
observed on both the valley walls of Dhauliganga river 
upstream of its confluence with Rishiganga river near 
Rini village at an altitude of 1,960 m asl, for about 1 km. 
From the impressions on the valley walls the level of the 
impounded water is assessed as being 3-4 m above the 
normal river level (Figure 7). 
To the N of Murunna (Figure 1), Rishiganga river is 
observed to have constricted valley configuration. Fresh 
deposits of debris are observed at this site on both the 
banks. The inundation and erosion marks observed on the 
valley walls at this site suggest the floodwaters to have 
reached 40-50 m above the riverbed (Figure 8).
Upper catchment of Raunthi Gadhera, the source of 
the floodwaters, could not be approached. Rocky cliff 
is however observed along the right bank of Raunthi 
Gadhera while the left bank is covered with thick pile of 
overburden material. Huge volume of debris comprising 
of a mixture of ice blocks, rock fragments and morainic 
material consisting mainly of pebbles, cobbles, and 
boulders of quartzite, granitic gneiss and mica schist with 
silty-clayey matrix are observed in the lower slopes in the 
proximity of Rishiganga river. Fine dust is also observed 
on the valley walls as also over vegetation. 
Figure 7. Erosion marks on the valley walls of Dhauliganga 
river near its confluence with Rishiganga river (above), and 1 
km upstream along Dhauliganga river (below).
Figure 8. Erosion marks on the valley walls of Rishiganga 
river to the N of Murunna.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jees.v3i2.3069
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Evidences of previous damming are also observed 
on the right bank of Raunthi Gadhera upstream of its 
confluence with Rishiganga river. These lacustrine 
deposits are observed to consist of an inter-bedded 
sequence of sand, and pebbles (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Evidence of ponding on the right bank of Raunthi 
Gadhera near its confluence with Rishiganga river.
Around 500-700 meters upstream of the confluence of 
Rishiganga and Raunthi Gadhera blockade is observed on 
Rishiganga river. Huge volume of rock and debris material 
(Figure 5) dumped there is observed to be around 50 m 
high and 100 m wide. Presence of embedded ice blocks 
is also observed in this barrier. Upstream of this barrier a 
lake is observed on Rishiganga river along a deep gorge 
carved in very hard quartzitic rocks that have three sets of 
consistent joints. 
6. Meteorological Parameters Preceding the
Disaster
Flash flood requires large volume of water to 
overwhelm the downstream areas, and apart from breach 
of a lake, presence of water can generally be explained 
either by rainfall or melting of snow/ice. Meteorological 
parameters, particularly rainfall, and temperature, in the 
surrounding area in the period preceding the flash flood 
incidence are therefore reviewed. 
Average precipitation in Uttarakhand during the winter 
season of 2020-21 was below normal, and except for 
November 2020 deficiency in average monthly rainfall in 
all the districts between September 2020, and February 
2021 was between 34 and 99%. The precipitation in 
Chamoli district that houses Dhauliganga valley, as also 
around the affected area at Tapoban, and Auli (AWS sites 
of Uttarakhand State Disaster Management Authority) 
was also much less than normal for the district between 
September 2020, and February 2021. The affected area 
however received some precipitation on February 4 and 
5, 2021 and higher reaches experienced snowfall that is 
observed in the satellite imagery of the area (Figure 4). 
As inferred by IIRS, Dehradun from WRF model the 
area did actually witness sharp rise in the temperature on 
the very day of this incidence; between February 6 and 7, 
2021 Tapoban at an altitude of 2,000 m asl experienced 
rise of 2.8oC and 5.4oC respectively in minimum, and 
maximum temperature while the rise at Auli (2,600 m asl) 
was observed to be 6.0oC and 9.6 oC respectively.
7. Scenario Reconstruction
Geomorphic conditions in the Dhauliganga valley provide 
suitable conditions for river blockade and the same is 
testified by field evidences of damming at two places (Figures 
6 and 9). Field evidences further reveal that the flash flood 
event of February 7, 2021 was accompanied by damming 
at three different places, besides the one upstream of the 
confluence of Raunthi Gadhera and Rishiganga river. This 
facilitated accumulation of enough water, despite discharge 
of Rishiganga river being cut off, and explains devastating 
flood during the lean flow season.
7.1 Damming of Raunthi Gadhera 
The upper reaches of Raunthi  Gadhera being 
snowbound could not be assessed during the fieldwork. 
However, authors in line with WIHG, Dehradun assert 
preliminary blockade in the upper catchment of Raunthi 
Gadhera by the rock and ice mass detached from a 
higher elevation, as also morainic deposits mobilized 
by the impact from the valley floor. The people of the 
surrounding villages reportedly heard sound of falling 
rocks around 0200 hrs on February 7, 2021. This is taken 
as the timing of the initial rock fall and creation of a 
rock fall-avalanche barrier along the course of Raunthi 
Gadhera at an altitude of around 3,600 m asl.
Moreover, the region witnessed precipitation on 
February 4 and 5, 2021 and fresh snow was present 
in the upper reaches of the catchment on February 6, 
2021 (Figure 4). Sharp rise in temperature on the very 
day of this incidence facilitated fast melting of freshly 
accumulated snow as also detached ice mass (Figure 3), 
and this water accumulated upstream of the avalanche 
debris. As put forth by an unpublished report of GAPHAZ, 
buried ice and water trapped under and within the 2016 
avalanche debris would have also added to this water.
As put forth by various reports another avalanche 
activity in the upper reaches of Raunthi Gadhera around 
1015 hrs on February 7, 2021 resulted in breach of this 
impoundment. The water generated by frictional forces 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.30564/jees.v3i2.3069
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and impact of rock fall as suggested by various reports 
only added to the volume of the flood waters. 
7.2 Lake on Rishiganga River 
Breach of the avalanche dam in the upper reaches of 
Raunthi Gadhera resulted in sudden downslope gush of 
water along steep slope that transported huge volume 
of glacial material, ice and rock mass. This movement 
generated a plume of dust that is observed on the valley 
walls as also over vegetation.
This fast moving debris laden water eroded the valley 
slope on the left bank of Raunthi Gadhera and the eroded 
mass added to the debris material transported downstream. 
Large rounded chunks of ice transported by floodwaters 
were observed all along the valley slope after many days 
of the incidence which refute the hypothesis of instant 
melting of ice resulting in flash flood.
The fast moving and debris, ice and rock mass laden 
flow of Raunthi Gadhera smashed against the valley 
wall on the right bank of Rishiganga river (2315 m asl). 
High angular relationship of these streams caused flow 
deflection, which facilitated backflow along Rishiganga 
river and large volume of rock and debris material was 
transported upstream along Rishiganga river for about 500 
- 700 m and dumped there (Figure 5). This barrier cut off 
discharge of Rishiganga river and the water draining down 
from Raunthi Gadhera alone flowed downstream along 
the course of Rishiganga river till February 12, 2021.
7.3 Intermittent Damming N of Murunna 
Though the discharge of Rishiganga river was blocked 
by the debris barrier, the floodwaters of Raunthi Gadhera 
travelled downstream along the course of Rishiganga 
river. Field evidences suggest that the course of 
Rishiganga river was blocked again intermittently to the N 
of Murunna (Figure 1) by the debris being carried by the 
floodwaters. Constricted valley configuration at this site 
facilitated the damming (Figure 8). Deposits of debris are 
observed at this site on both the banks and evidences on 
the valley walls suggest that the impoundment was up to 
40-50 m above the riverbed.
With discharge of Rishiganga river cut off, but for this
impoundment the flood would not have been particularly 
devastating. It is this damming that ensured accumulation 
of enough water to devastate the downstream areas. With 
the breach of this barrier floodwaters rushed downstream 
washing away Rishiganga hydropower project upstream 
of Rini. 
7.4 Intermittent Damming around Rini 
Rishiganga river meets Dhauliganga river at almost 
right angles near Rini village at an altitude of 1,960 m 
asl. The floodwaters of Raunthi Gadhera travelling down 
the course of Rishiganga river along with huge amount 
of debris and rock mass hit the valley wall on the right 
bank of Dhauliganga river deflecting its flow, and causing 
deposition of debris to block the course of Dhauliganga 
river for a short duration. The evidences of impoundment 
of water are observed on the valley walls along the course 
of Dhauliganga river upto 1 km upstream of its confluence 
with Rishiganga river, and the level of the impounded 
water is assessed as being 3-4 m above the normal river 
level (Figure 7). It is this blockade that added huge 
volume of water, and its breach resulted in the 
devastation of downstream areas including the 
hydropower project at Tapoban.
8. Discussion and Way Forward
The fr ic t ional  forces  and impact  of  the rock  
avalanche facilitated melting of ice but it could not have 
instantaneously produced around 6 million cu m water. 
The assertion of instantaneous melting of ice is at the 
same time refuted by large chunks of ice observed in the 
debris material along the lower slopes of Raunthi Gadhera 
as also those enbedded in the debris barrier damming the 
Rishiganga river. Therefore, based on field evidences, 
the flood event of February 7, 2021 is attributed to 
sequential intermittent damming along the course of 
Raunthi Gadhera, Rishiganga, and Dhauliganga rivers. 
Absence of warning infrastructure in the catchment 
resulted in massive loss of human lives as a simple 
water level recorder based warning system around the 
hydropower project on Rishiganga river would have 
averted loss of human lives at Tapoban. The following 
measures are therefore recommended to avert similar 
incidences in future. 
8.1 Disaster Risk Assessment 
It seems that the flood history of Dhauliganga river 
(Table 2) and evidences of previous damming (Figure 
6, and 9) were ignored while planning the hydropower 
projects. Comprehensive inventory of previous disaster 
incidences is therefore recommended to establish the 
hazard profile of the area. Risk assessment should 
accordingly be undertaken and account for extreme events 
with long recurrence period. This should be a mandatory 
legal requirement for all major developmental projects 
in the Himalayan region. Putting these reports in public 
domain would either discourage the insurance companies 
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from extending safety cover to the unsafe projects or force 
them to make premiums economically unviable. This 
in turn would ensure that only disaster safe projects are 
implemented in this hazard prone terrain. 
8.2 Warning Generation and Dissemination 
With present level of technical knowledge, instrumentation, 
and communication facilities warnings, particularly of hydro-
meteorological events, can be easily generated and disseminated. 
A network of hydro-meteorological observatories with real 
time data transmission capability should thus be calibrated 
for this purpose to provide rainfall threshold based flood / 
flash flood and landslide warnings. Hydropower projects 
should be mandated to contribute data and resources 
towards this network. 
Streams and rivers are generally dammed at places 
with favourable geomorphic configuration and these areas 
can be identified through dedicated geomorphic mapping. 
Appropriate monitoring infrastructure should be resorted 
to around these places for prompt mitigation measures in 
case of damming.
����������
Diversification of assets, though a risk reduction 
strategy, ensures equitable development of the region. 
In the present context two hydropower projects were 
located in close proximity, and both were damaged in 
the incidence. It is therefore suggested that as a policy 
measure, major infrastructure not be allowed to be 
concentrated in a particular area. 
At present most investors desist from venturing into 
remote areas of the province, and are keen to invest 
in areas that are relatively developed in terms of basic 
infrastructure and facilities. To start with the state could 
create basic facilities and infrastructure in identified 
suitable parts of the state and the same could be an 
incentive for the investors to explore possibilities of 
setting up their venture in other areas. As a by-product, 
this exercise would ensure balanced development of the 
province. 
8.4 Abnormal Meteorological Observations 
The present incidence was accompanied by abnormal 
rise in temperature. It is therefore suggested that abnormal 
changes in meteorological parameters be taken note 
of seriously and correlated with possible triggering of 
some hazard prevalent in the proximity. Precautionary 
actions can also be initiated based on such observations. 
This exercise is sure to be futile in most instances but is 
certainly worth trying, as it could sometimes save human 
lives. 
9. Conclusions
Though not conclusively attributed to climate change
abnormal temperature rise contributed to this disaster 
in one way or the other, while sequential intermittent 
damming increased the devastating potential of the 
floodwaters. The possibility of recurrence of similar 
incidences gaining ground with climate change impacts 
becoming increasingly prominent, the region is to face 
scarcity of capital investment which in turn is to have 
adverse impact on the pace of growth and socio-economic 
development. With environmental groups already lined 
up to hold hydropower projects responsible for this 
disaster, the fate of hydropower as also other major 
infrastructure projects in the Himalayan region is sure to 
have long-term adverse implications. 
In order to ensure disaster resilient, environment 
friendly, and holistic development of the region authors 
recommend (i) scientific documentation of previous 
catastrophic events, (ii) detailed, focused, and long-
term studies for in depth assessment of risk posed by 
various hazards, with incorporation of climate change 
driven extreme events, (iii) implementation of a legally 
binding disaster risk assessment, and reduction regime, 
(iii) robust, reliable, and redundant warning generation, 
and dissemination infrastructure, and (v) policy for the 
diversification of assets.
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